The Quiet Communism of Modern Italy

Sarah Taylor, Staff Writer

 Though commonly considered to be a thoroughly Western and modernized country, a look into Italian politics sheds light on the deeply rooted cracks in the system created by underlying communist ideals. Smaller cities in Italy experience lower living conditions and struggle to develop sustainable local economies, leading to commonplace power outages, high unemployment, and low salaries. The unemployment rate in Italy is around 11%,[1] with the average salary less than 1400 euros per month.[2] For contrast, the United States’ unemployment rate as of October 2017 is 4.1%[3] with an average salary of around $3400 per month.[4] In the case of Italy, these conditions are representative of a more deeply rooted and intricately difficult political history. Many of the central regions in Italy have maintained close ties to the communist ideology that was once reflected in the local power of the Partito Communista Italiano (PCI). The depressed living conditions of many historic cities and towns stems from a history of political complexity, spurred by the everlasting search for power of the Italian communists.

Many elements of the particular brand of communism predominant in Italy differ from the traditional Stalinist origins of the ideology. Compared to the Bolshevik-driven birth of communism in the Soviet Union, Italian communism and the PCI specifically were not revolutionary in origin, and operated within a capitalist regime, adapting to the system in place.[5] Italian communism encouraged political pluralism, and worked to actively attract new members to the party by acquiescing to the extant ideology of the Italian people. A country steeped in Catholicism, the Church posed a potential, and sometimes real, threat to the legitimacy and operations of the PCI. After World War II, Communists and Catholics alike participated in the Resistenza (Resistance) against Fascism, working to topple Benito Mussolini’s dictatorship. Italians who felt allegiance to both Catholicism and Communism formed the Party of Communist Catholics.[6] As the Christian Democrat party started to take shape, however, the possibility of cooperation between Catholics and Communists dissipated. The tensions between the Catholic church and the Communist faction in Italy reached their height in 1947, leading up to the 1948 election. In May of 1947, Alcide de Gasperi, the leader of the Christian Democrats, drove the Communist party representation out of government.[7] The election of 1948 pitted devoted Catholics against staunch Communists. The victory of the Christian Democrats was seen as a victory of the Church over the USSR. Relations between Catholics and Communists began to improve after the 1948 election, however. Pope John XXIII (1958-1963) brought in a new era of political freedom within the Church, encouraging Italian Catholics to make their own political choices, and supported cooperation between the Socialist and Communist parties.[8] The elections of 1948 in Italy brought great concern to the United States and Great Britain, who feared that the feverish communism would spread from the USSR and Eastern Bloc into Italy. In order to prevent a full transition into a communist Italy, the CIA allegedly worked to sway the elections against communism, supporting a rising Christian Democrats party that would continue to rule in Italy until 1992.

One of the major points that makes Italian communism unique in the international community is its survival after the fall of the Soviet Union. The PCI developed a unique brand of Communism from Soviet Communism, maintaining a much larger degree of internal differentiation in terms of structure, ideology, and behavior.[9] The elites and the mass population were brought together under the common ideals of Communism, and the existence of a party that encouraged this pluralism the way the PCI did enhanced the general stability of the Italian political system as a whole, thereby legitimizing the spread of Italian Communism. While the ideology of different communities and different people varied greatly, leading to conflict between regions and individuals, the PCI kept radical leftism in check and pushed for more left-leaning policy under the Christian Democrat rule.[10] Achille Occhetto, a prominent Italian Communist politician, was responsible for the major reforms that aimed to place a larger emphasis on individual liberties, environmental protection, and women’s rights. These changes led to the official dissolution of the PCI in 1991, permanently transforming Europe’s largest communist party (second only to the Soviet Union).[11] The party was officially renamed to the Partito Democratico della Sinistra (Democratic Party of the Left, or PDS), though this rebranding was merely that: a curtain over the still-existing communist ideology of the party in the face of the fall of the Eastern Bloc. Interestingly, many of the similar elements of Communism in Italy are seen in the conservative parties farther right. The prevalence of Communism enabled the Italian people to think of politics in terms of anti-institutional and anti-establishment sentiments. The rising populist party, Lega Nord (Northern League), draws on these same sentiments translated into conservatism and federalism.

Though the Christian Democrat party was the majority party for half a century, the PCI and communist ideology had a lasting impact on the social structure and functioning of Italy. The communist following in Italy developed a cultural dictatorship to compensate for their political losses, a facet of Italian culture that has remained heavily ingrained in present-day culture. PCI brought high culture, literacy, personal dignity and an enhanced sense of self to many Italians.[12] Tensions within and between the political parties that dominate Italian politics have created an uncertainty among the Italian people over whose cultural program to follow. For a country with an already deep divide between the regions, these competing ideologies and cultural elements have only strengthened the regionalism of the country. Different regions represent different political ideologies that produce rivalries between regions and disunity over the entire country, such as the rising populism of the Lega Nord in the northern regions and prevalent communism in the central and southern regions. With these tensions drawing most of the focus of the competing parties, little attention is paid to the real underlying problems that have been caused by the political infighting and erroneous wealth distribution. The regions of Tuscany, Emilia-Romagna, and Umbria in particular still show strong allegiance to the communist ideology, as the PCI had a stronghold in local and municipal government administration in these regions, establishing a “red belt” through the country.[13] The cities remain the same aesthetically as they did in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries as a testament not only to the importance of beauty and history in Italian culture, but also to the stagnant growth and reluctance to spend money on public works. The cost of living is high while the salaries are low, and the youth unemployment rate of over 35%[14] is forcing most people under the age of thirty to move back in with their parents. When the PCI was dissolved, the provincial and local governments that had relied on Communist leadership in these key regions were left with gaps in their administration. The resulting political instability left the regions stuck in a 1980s time-loop, unable to resolve the poor living conditions and properly allocate resources. Communism in Italy underlies many of the problems with polarization and conflict at the government and regional levels, as well as the slow economic growth of the country as a whole. Interregional tensions and a Western aversion to Communism make it unlikely that the problems caused by this political instability will be resolved with definitive, comprehensive policy.

Footnotes:

[1] “Italy Unemployment Rate 1983-2017.” Trading Economics. Accessed November 10, 2017. https://tradingeconomics.com/italy/unemployment-rate.

[2] 2

[3]“Bureau of Labor Statistics Data.” U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Accessed November 10, 2017. https://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LNS14000000.

[4] Doyle, Alison. “How Much Is the Average Salary for US Workers?” The Balance. October 24, 2017. Accessed November 10, 2017. https://www.thebalance.com/average-salary-information-for-us-workers-2060808.

[5] Bosquet, Michel. “Aspects of Italian Communism.” The Socialist Register. 1964. 83.

[6] Carrillo, Elisa. “The Italian Catholic Church and Communism, 1943-1963”. The Catholic Historical Review, 77 (4), 644-657. 1991. 644.

[7] Carrillo, “The Italian Catholic Church and Communism, 1943-1963”, 650.

[8] Carrillo, “The Italian Catholic Church and Communism, 1943-1963”, 654.

 

[9] Tarrow, Sidney. “Political Dualism and Italian Communism”. The American Political Science Review, 61 (1), 39-53. 1967. 42.

[10] Tarrow, Sidney. “Political Dualism and Italian Communism”. The American Political Science Review, 61 (1), 39-53. 1967. 40 – 41.

[11] Eubank, William Lee, Gangopadahay, Arun, Weinberg, Leonard. “Italian Communism in Crisis”. Party Politics, 2 (1), 55-75. 1996. 55.

[12] Baranski, Zygmunt G. The Cambridge Companion to Modern Italian Culture. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

[13] Breschi, Danilo. “From Politics to Lifestyle and/or Anti-Politics: Political Culture and the Sense for the State in Post-Communist Italy.” Telos, 2013. 113 – 114.

[14] https://tradingeconomics.com/italy/youth-unemployment-rate

The Flight of the Rohingya

Emma Donahue, Staff Writer

Behind the Name

The term “Rohingya” refers to a religious ethnic group which practices a form of Sunni Islam who have historically inhabited the Burmese (or Myanmar) state of Rakhine. Their name is controversial because it derives from “Rohang,” their word for “Arakan,” the former name for the Rakhine State, the region of Myanmar which holds the majority of its Muslim population. Since this title is essentially a claim to a portion of Myanmar’s land, the government and majority Buddhist population are extremely wary of its usage by a Muslim group who are not officially recognized as citizens.[1] Despite having their own language and cultural practices, these technicalities and years of conflict with their Buddhist neighbors have left the Rohingya as one of the largest stateless groups in the world.[2]

Tensions flared in 1982 when the Burmese government identified 135 ethnic groups who were entitled to citizenship, yet the Rohingya were not included on this list, despite having been granted equal rights as citizens in the country’s independence from Britain in 1948.[3] Following the implementation of this legislation, the Rohingya were almost immediately stripped of their previous rights. Persecution ensued over the next several decades, including the enforcement of a two-child law, the banning of interfaith marriage, and a lack of access to government-funded education and healthcare.[4] Violence emerged in 2012 after Muslim men allegedly raped and murdered a Buddhist woman, and over 100,000 Rohingya were displaced as a result of the assault. In response to the crisis, the Myanmar government offered to grant the group a reduced level of citizenship if they would register as Bengali rather than Rohingya, an offer not taken well by a group so connected to their identity and the suffering faced because of it.[5]

 

Continuing Violence

            In October of 2013, a group of Buddhist men carried out a series of attacks on Muslim villages throughout Rakhine. Three years later, an insurgent group formed within the state of Rakhine known as the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA). ARSA attacked a number of Myanmar’s security outposts as a response to the recent violence towards the Rohingya and the fallout from these offensives caused the military crackdown that has displaced hundreds of thousands of Muslims in the past few years.[6] Over the next four months, Myanmar’s army, known as the Tatmadaw, (which is unaffiliated with the civic government) was responsible for the alleged killing and gang rapes of countless Rohingya, who were forced from their homes with a scorched earth policy.[7] On August 25, 2017, ARSA attacked several police posts and an army base, spurring the most current influx of refugees into Bangladesh in light of the vicious counter attacks against the civilian population: rape, killing, brutal beatings, and more burning of villages.

According to Tom Malinowski, U.S. diplomat and former Assistant Secretary of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, the Burmese military made the mistake of responding to extremist group ARSA with force towards innocent civilian populations, thereby using a religious conflict between the majority and minority populations to preserve their political authority over the Myanmar Buddhists.[8]

 

Myanmar’s Response

            Historically, the Burmese have been wary of the Rohingya claim to an autonomous area of land, which would be taken out of Rakhine territory near the Bangladesh border. The military believes this desire for sovereignty would create a breeding ground for ARSA-like militant groups.[9] While the Rakhines are also an ethnic minority in Myanmar, they are a predominantly Buddhist people, placing them on the same side as staunch Buddhist nationalists who do not want their country overtaken by Muslims (despite the fact that the overall Muslim population is 4%).[10]

Some responses to these issues have included the proposition of joint military action between Bangladesh and Tatmadaw against ARSA, as well as Myanmar’s UN commision under former Secretary-General Kofi Annan to review the 1982 citizenship law and issue recommendations.[11] While Myanmar’s civic government leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, embraced these recommendations, ARSA unleashed further attacks following the release of the government report which caused another military crackdown and further revenge violence towards the Rohingya.

Suu Kyi has faced much criticism from the international community for her silence regarding the ongoing persecution and subsequent refugee crisis. At one point, the Myanmar government slowed humanitarian aid to Rakhine, leaving those remaining with scarce food and water.[12] This action was explained as being a necessary counter-insurgency precaution rather than a human rights crisis, and Suu Kyi has been avoiding public statements because her power hinges on not being overthrown by the military, which she has no governance over.[13] Her office leaked a phone call made early this September to the President of Turkey, during which she is recorded saying that misinformation about the crisis is being spread to promote the interests of terrorists in Rakhine. Soon afterwards, she cancelled her planned visit to the UN. Many have remarked on the fact that she is in a difficult situation politically, as the military is backed by the majority of the country, while others have called for the recall of her Nobel Peace Prize.[14]

Despite this, she recently made a statement calling for a relief plan for the Rohingya Muslims. She wishes to set up a civilian-led agency to give aid and resettle those displaced from their homes by the violence- a number now greater than 500,000, most of whom are currently residing in Bangladesh.[15] Some have arrived in recent days, which is inconsistent with the Tatmadaw claim that it halted actions against the Rohingya in early September. One of Suu Kyi’s advisor’s claimed that the leader is attempting to make her government more transparent to the international community by accepting foreign aid to help with the migrant crisis, and that her previous silence was due to her precarious situation with the military rather than a lack of acknowledgement.[16]

 

Refugee Situation

            Currently, about half of the refugee population is residing around the Bangladeshi city of Balukhali in tent cities, and the rate at which it has grown over the past several months has made this the quickest mass exodus since the Rwandan genocide in 1994.[17] They are living next to Kutupalong, another refugee camp home to the first wave of Rohingya who fled Rakhine in the 90s’. To say the Bangladesh government is overwhelmed would be an understatement; only a fifth of the newest arrivals have access to food rations (which consist of rice and biscuits), and aid agencies say water sources could run out in a few months. Furthermore, only 100,000 of about 288,000 children have access to any sort of education.

Both local and international organizations have been helping the government with humanitarian aid: the World Food Program and UN agencies set up relief centers in the camps, and local Bangladeshi groups have filled trucks with food and clothing and distributed the aid.[18] The government itself has set aside 2,000 acres in Balukhali for their military to set up a more organized camp, but construction has barely begun and it has been reported that the land is nearly uninhabitable. Refugees also need biometric forms of identification in order to receive aid distribution, and the process of creating these IDs could take up to half a year.

The level of poverty and disease within these camps are unthinkable. Besides the shortage of food and water, there is an absence of latrines or any form of sewage, so the ground is covered with waste and human feces. To prevent the spread of disease and further chaos, the government imposed travel restrictions on the Rohingya so that they are not permitted past a certain checkpoint; essentially, they are trapped in these camps and largely unable to return to Rakhine. Many claim to have seen landmines being installed along the border to prevent their return, and others are certain they would not be permitted re-entry as they are not identified as citizens.[19]

 

Possible Resolutions

            A local government aid coordinator for Bangladesh recently stated that the refugees only have a temporary home in their country, and that while they will feed and aid the refugees for as long as they can, it is not a permanent home.[20] Suu Kyi’s recent unveiling of her plan for the repatriation of the Rohingya refugees is a step in the right direction, assuming she can keep the military at bay and protect her own authority in the process. However, a long term, comprehensive strategy needs to be determined regarding Myanmar’s treatment of their Muslim population, along with more thorough investigations into the soldiers’ behavior towards civilians to prevent the same tragedies from repeating themselves in the future.

 

Footnotes:

[1]  Megan Specia, “The Rohingya in Myanmar: How Years of Strife Grew Into a Crisis,” The New York Times,  September 13, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/13/world/asia/myanmar-rohingya-Muslim.html

[2] Ibid.

[3]Krishnadev Calamur, “The Misunderstood Roots of Burma’s Rohingya Crisis,” The Atlantic, September 25, 2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/09/rohingyas-burma/540513/

[4]Megan Specia, “The Rohingya in Myanmar: How Years of Strife Grew Into a Crisis,” The New York Times,  September 13, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/13/world/asia/myanmar-rohingya-Muslim.html

[5]Krishnadev Calamur, “The Misunderstood Roots of Burma’s Rohingya Crisis,” The Atlantic, September 25, 2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/09/rohingyas-burma/540513/

[6] Megan Specia, “The Rohingya in Myanmar: How Years of Strife Grew Into a Crisis,” The New York Times,  September 13, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/13/world/asia/myanmar-rohingya-Muslim.html

[7] Ibid.

[8]Krishnadev Calamur, “The Misunderstood Roots of Burma’s Rohingya Crisis,” The Atlantic, September 25, 2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/09/rohingyas-burma/540513/

[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Ibid.

[12]Megan Specia, “The Rohingya in Myanmar: How Years of Strife Grew Into a Crisis,” The New York Times,  September 13, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/13/world/asia/myanmar-rohingya-Muslim.html

[13] Ibid.

[14] Ibid.

[15]Patrick Wintour, “Aung San Suu Kyi unveils relief plans for Rohingya Muslims,” The Guardian, October 13, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/13/aung-san-suu-kyi-unveils-relief-plans-for-rohingya-Muslims-myanmar

[16] Ibid.

[17]Max Bearak, “One month on, a bleak new reality emerges for 436,000 Rohingya refugees,” The Washington Post, September 25, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/one-month-on-a-bleak-new-reality-emerges-for-436000-rohingya-refugees/2017/09/25/acbb2ff4-9d7e-11e7-b2a7-bc70b6f98089_story.html?utm_term=.2472dead6204

[18] Ibid.

[19] Bearak, The Washington Post

[20] Ibid.

“Cool Japan” and the Sources, Extent, and Implications of Japanese Soft Power in the United States

Thomas Bell, Staff Writer

From our Print Edition, 2017-2018

  Throughout most of history, international relations have been largely defined by hard power.  Hard power is an element of national strength, centered around the basic functions of the nation-state: military force and economic action.¹ This historical reality is logical, given the limitations on communication and transnational exposure for much of the pre-20th century world, with hard power oftentimes being the only way to interact between states.  In the diplomatic arena before instantaneous communication, it would be difficult to exert national will in any other way, with the target country often seemingly distant and mysterious. Contrarily, soft power  is a relatively modern phenomenon, especially since the end of the Second World War. It also centers around achieving national objectives, but is more concerned with using cultural and societal means to persuade other nations to share their goals.²  This requires a high level of interconnectedness between civilizations to allow for cultures and ideas to be traded and to have an effect. Such a high level of cultural exchange was impossible before the advent of modern technology and global connectedness.

  This is not to say that all countries have been able to maximize this new element of international relations.  The culture of Kyrgyzstan, for example, is relatively unknown in the United States. That country’s morals, goals, and societal structures are difficult to understand for most non-Kyrgyz, and thus, their soft power is largely nonexistent on an international scale.  One of the countries, however, that has best adapted to this new element of the global arena is Japan.

  The reasons for Japanese dominance of soft power are arguably not by choice.  The Japanese have been largely forced down this road, and the reasons why are best exemplified in the current Japanese constitution, adopted after World War II.  Article 9 of that document states that “the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation,” as well as “the threat or use of force.” It further decrees that “land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained.”³ Though Japan maintains a “self-defense force,”⁴  its ability to project itself internationally is virtually nonexistent. This means that even economic hard power is curtailed, as the implicit threat of force is not present. As we have seen since 1945, it can be difficult for a nation to adequately wield hard power when its ability to use force is effectively eliminated.  

  Adapting to this new reality has been a tremendously successful endeavor for the Japanese.  Now unable to conquer nations with its once formidable military, it has had to rely on cultural domination.  The government has emphasized the idea of “Cool Japan,”⁵ in order to improve the economy and national image. Japanese society has seen itself stretch far beyond its borders, a remarkable development for a nation known for its historical isolation.  A new era of international affairs was born, and the Japanese soon found themselves exporting their culture at an absolutely unprecedented rate.

  In the United States, this has manifested itself in a number of important ways.  As an example, Japanese food has become immensely popular; or at the very least, Japanese-inspired food.  Ever since the California roll was invented in Los Angeles in the early 1970s,⁶ Americanized sushi has become a modern staple of the United States, spreading further to other countries.  Japanese food is available in most American supermarkets, and it is estimated that there are approximately 9,000 Japanese restaurants operating in the country today.⁷

  Japanese popular culture is also a critical player in the American psyche.  Media franchises such as Super Mario, Hello Kitty, Godzilla, and Final Fantasy sell a multitude of products in the United States, from video games and movies to lunchboxes and t-shirts.  Japanese manga and anime, though a relatively niche category, have become increasingly popular in the United States, with series such as Dragon Ball, Naruto, and Pokémon achieving high levels of success.  There is a level of acknowledgment of Japanese influence, and it has embedded itself in the fabric of modern American popular culture, especially among younger generations. It is the actualization of “Cool Japan.”⁸

  The impact of Japan transcends even obvious exemplars of culture, as a sampling of the largest Japanese corporations reveals dozens of household names⁹.  Americans drive cars made by Toyota, Honda, and Nissan, fixed with Bridgestone tires. They use Canon and Nikon cameras, and buy electronics from Panasonic, Toshiba, and Sharp.  Their pianos come from Yamaha, and their video games from Nintendo, Sony, and Sega. The products of Japanese corporations fill American households and workplaces, bringing a level of cultural intimacy that the soldiers on either side of the War in the Pacific could never have imagined in 1943. Ultimately, this is the point of soft power.  To imagine that a country like Japan could flip the script, from mortal enemy to supplier of cars and televisions, from militaristic empire to pop-culture hegemony, points to the influence and importance of Japanese soft power. In a 2015 Chicago Council Survey, 88% of Americans recognized that bilateral relations with Japan were either very important or somewhat important.¹⁰ As opposed to the sharp edge of military force or economic action, Japan has made its former enemy into its now-biggest supporter, while staying mostly constrained to the realm of non-forceful action.

  The extent of Japan’s soft power has even become so influential that it permeates the international community.  This was apparent in a brief video played during the closing ceremony of the 2016 Rio Games, touting the upcoming 2020 Summer Olympics in Tokyo.  Amidst a flurry of sporting events and scenic shots of Tokyo prefecture, cultural figures such as manga character Captain Tsubasa, a cheerleading Hello Kitty, and a racing Pac-Man featured prominently,¹¹ tying the most famous elements of Japan’s popular culture to the capital city itself.  Most telling, however, was a scene when the Japanese Prime Minister, Shinzō Abe, was digitally transformed into Mario, before emerging in Rio de Janeiro, red cap and all. This scene represented not only a metaphorical, but a physical connection between Japanese culture and the government. It best demonstrated the desire to use Japan’s wide portfolio of cultural assets, such as the internationally known Mario, for the benefit of the Japanese nation itself and its image.  The implicit message was that to love Japanese culture is to love Japan, as embodied by the Prime Minister.

  However, this message has not worked with everyone.  This is most true in Japan’s own neighborhood, where 67% of South Koreans believe that Japan’s influence is negative, and 74% of Chinese say the same.¹²  Though the easy answer is to say that the legacy of the Second World War is to blame, ultimately nations like the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, and Indonesia fought long wars against the Japanese, and suffered under them, only to now have a positive outlook on the country.  Could the greater extent of devastation in China and South Korea explain the reluctance to support Japan, or does soft power simply have its limits? It is likely that the real reasons lie in the pages of history, where centuries of rivalry and conflict have poisoned the status of East Asian relations.  It can thus be argued that soft power, though effective in improving bilateral relations, is perhaps incapable of reversing centuries of tension. Soft power works as a deterrent and a healer of international wounds, but cannot heal the deep gashes of history – at least, not without more time.

  Ultimately, Japan’s ability to project and improve its national image through its soft power has opened up an entirely new element of international affairs, and a different way of measuring the dominance of states.  Writer Douglas McGray, in a famous essay, described Japan’s ability to manipulate its soft power as its “gross national cool.”¹³ Though obviously not a quantifiable statistic like gross national product or the human development index, this new term represents a variation in what it means to be a great power in the post-World War II era.  For Japan, this has meant a rise in soft power and in its ability to shape its own national image and the international perception of that image. Americans born in the years since World War II have been raised in a society where it is common to travel to the store in a Japanese car, buy Japanese inspired food and a Japanese television set, and use that set to watch Japanese cartoons and movies.  The two cultures have grown increasingly interconnected, and this has proven to be beneficial for both countries – Japan in particular. A nation once looking to heal itself and redefine its national identity after the most devastating war in human history, it has proven capable of using its soft power to not only survive in the post-war community, but to thrive as one of the world’s true great powers.

Footnotes

1) Nye, Joseph S. “Propaganda Isn’t the Way: Soft Power.” Belfercenter.org. Last modified             January 10, 2003. https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/propaganda-isnt-way-soft-     power.

2) Nye, Joseph S. “Propaganda Isn’t the Way: Soft Power.” Belfercenter.org. Last modified             January 10, 2003. https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/propaganda-isnt-way-soft-     power.

3) The Constitution of Japan. Tokyo, Japan: Japanese Government, 1946.

4) Pike, John. “Japan – Introduction.” Global Security. Last modified February 27, 2016.

https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/japan/intro.htm.

5) Iwabuchi, Koichi. “Pop-culture diplomacy in Japan: soft power, nation branding and the    question of ‘international cultural exchange’.” Taylor and Francis Online. Last modified June 23, 2015. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10286632.2015.1042469.

6) Renton, Alex. “How sushi ate the world.” The Guardian. Last modified February 26, 2006. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/feb/26/japan.foodanddrink.

7) Lee, Jee Hye, Johye Hwang, and Azlin Mustapha. “Popular Ethnic Foods in the United States:     A Historical and Safety Perspective.” Wiley Online Library. Last modified December           17, 2013. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1541-4337.12044/full.

8) Iwabuchi, Koichi. “Pop-culture diplomacy in Japan: soft power, nation branding and the    question of ‘international cultural exchange’.” Taylor and Francis Online. Last modified June 23, 2015. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10286632.2015.1042469.

9) EW Content Team. “Forbes Global 2000: Japan’s Largest Companies.” Economy Watch. Last       modified July 3, 2013. http://www.economywatch.com/companies/forbes-list/japan.html.

10) Friedhoff, Karl, and Dina Smeltz. “Strong Alliances, Divided Publics: Public Opinion in the    United States, Japan, South Korea, and China.” The Chicago Council on Global           Affairs. Last modified October 19, 2015. https://www.thechicagocouncil.org/publication/strong-alliances-divided-publics-public-            opinion-united-states-japan-south-korea-and.

11) Easton, Yukari. “Tokyo 2020 and Japan’s Soft Power.” The Diplomat. Last modified August    31, 2016. https://thediplomat.com/2016/08/tokyo-2020-and-japans-soft-power/.

12) BBC World Service, ed. “Views of China and India Slide While UK’s Ratings Climb: Global     Poll.” BBC. Last modified May 22, 2013.  https://www.globescan.com/images/images/pressreleases/

    bbc2013_country_ratings/2013_country_rating_poll_bbc_globescan.pdf.

13) McGray, Douglas. “Japan’s Gross National Cool.” Foreign Policy. Last modified November          11, 2009. http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/11/11/japans-gross-national-cool/.